Philip Carroll v. Township of Mount Laurel by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-4-2012 
Philip Carroll v. Township of Mount Laurel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Philip Carroll v. Township of Mount Laurel" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 310. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/310 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-289        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 








 TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT LAUREL 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-05515) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 20, 2012 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 







 In 2006, Philip Carroll commenced an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the Township of Mount Laurel, seeking redress for an allegedly uncompensated 
regulatory taking of his property.  In particular, Carroll alleged that a Township 
“Resolution” – which declared an intention to preserve the corridor on which Carroll‟s 
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property is located “from incursion of commercial or non-residential development” – 
effected an “uncompensated regulatory taking of his private property.”  The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the Township‟s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Carroll=s claim was not ripe for adjudication because he had not 
sought from local government entities any available variances or permits regarding the 
use of his property.  See Williamson Cnty. Reg‟l Planning Comm‟n v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. 172, 186, 195 (1985).  We affirmed.  Carroll v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 315 F. 
App‟x 402 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 Carroll next filed an “Inverse Condemnation” action in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Law Division, seeking compensation based on the Resolution.  The Superior 
Court dismissed the complaint.  Carroll appealed.  The Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, affirmed, stating that the “complaint filed by [Carroll] in state court alleges no 
action by defendant other than adoption of the Resolution.”  Carroll v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 2011 WL 650538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 24, 2011) (“not[ing] that 
[Carroll] is not precluded from challenging municipal action if there is a change of 
circumstances that actually affects the use of [his] property.”).  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey denied certification.  Carroll v. Township of Mount Laurel, 23 A.3d 413 (N.J. 
2011) (table).    
 Thereafter, Carroll resumed his efforts to obtain relief in the District Court.  In 
particular, he filed a motion to reopen, arguing that he had a right to return to federal 
court for adjudication of his claims pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. 
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Exam‟rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).  Carroll also filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).  The District Court denied the motions, holding that Carroll‟s 
arguments did not provide adequate grounds for relief.  Carroll appealed.
1
   
 The Supreme Court held in England that “when a federal court abstains from 
deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable the state courts to address an antecedent 
state-law issue, the plaintiff may reserve his right to return to federal court for the 
disposition of his federal claims.”  San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 
U.S. 323, 339 (2005).  England reservations, as they are known, have been permitted “in 
cases sent to state court to fulfill the ripeness requirements of Williamson County.”  R & 
J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Cnty. of Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 428 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (noting, however, that “the availability of an England reservation in the 
Williamson County context has been called into question by San Remo Hotel . . . .”).  
Under Williamson County, a claim that the application of a government regulation effects 
a taking of a property interest is not ripe until (1) “the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to the property at issue,” and (2) the property owner has “unsuccessfully 
                                              
1
 That appeal was docketed in this Court at C.A. No. 12-2092.  Thereafter, the 
District Court denied Carroll‟s motion seeking an entry of default under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 55.  Carroll filed another notice of appeal.  That appeal was docketed 
here as C.A. No. 12-2928.  With respect to that appeal, we conclude that the District 
Court properly denied the Rule 55 motion.  There is no merit to Carroll‟s argument that a 
default should have been entered in his favor because the Township had not responded to 
his Rule 60(b) motion.    
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attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for 
obtaining such compensation[,]” if those procedures are adequate.  473 U.S. at 195. 
 Here, Carroll attempted to obtain compensation in the “Inverse Condemnation” 
action that he filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  In those proceedings, Carroll 
made an express England reservation.  See Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 287 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (stating that “[r]eservation of England rights must be timely and may be 
express or implied.”).  As the District Court concluded, however, even though Carroll 
returned to state court, his “claim remains unripe.”  Nothing in the present record 
indicates that Carroll has administratively challenged the application of the Resolution to 
his property.  See Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 
83, 92 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “claims are not ripe due to [appellant‟s] failure to 
apply for a variance and receive a „final decision‟ from the Board.”); see also County 
Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing 
Williamson‟s “finality rule”).  Furthermore, the state court did not adjudicate Carroll‟s 
claim on the merits.  See Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 519 F.3d 564, 570-71 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiffs‟ takings claim was not ripe for review where the state 
court “never explicitly reached the merits of their claim” and “no procedural bar existed 
to prevent review”).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court 
properly denied Carroll‟s motion to reopen.     
 Furthermore, Carroll has failed to demonstrate that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion.  Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d 
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Cir. 2011) (stating that “[w]e . . . review a district court‟s denial of a Rule 60(b) . . .  
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.”).  In that motion, Carroll argued that the 
District Court, in granting the Township‟s motion for summary judgment, (1) erroneously 
stated that his property was not located within a “Business Development Overlay” zone 
and (2) improperly distinguished an order, issued in a separate but “factually analogous” 
action, brought against the Township.  As the District Court noted, however, the location 
of Carroll‟s property in a “Business Development Overlay” zone is not relevant to 
whether his takings claim was ripe.  Indeed, in granting the Township‟s motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court stated that “we need not reach the issue of what 
uses may have been permitted because [Carroll] has not shown that the resolution has the 
legal effect of restricting the use of the property.”    
 Carroll‟s Rule 60(b) motion also relied on an order entered in DiCristo Realty v. 
Township of Mount Laurel, No. 02-cv-03868 (D.N.J.).  In that order, the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected as arbitrary the Township‟s basis for 
reversing two conditional use variances.  Here, however, the relevant issue is whether 
Carroll‟s takings claim is ripe, not whether the Township properly rejected a variance 
request.  As noted above, it does not appear in the record before us that Carroll either 
sought, or was denied, a variance.  Furthermore, even if the order in DiCristo was 
germane to the facts of Carroll‟s case, that order had no precedential effect.  See 
Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that “it is clear that there is no such thing as „the law of the district.‟”).  Therefore, the 
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order in DiCristo has no bearing on the District Court‟s decision to grant the Township‟s 
motion for summary judgment in Carroll‟s case. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
